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TRADE BARRIERS CREATED BY BUSINESS
CORWIN D. EDWARDS*
The trade barrier legislation which has received so much
attention in the last few years has often been discussed as
though it were a peculiar infirmity of state governments
which has suddenly broken out after lying dormant since
the days of the Articles of Confederation. Although the
rapid spread of certain kinds of state trade barrier legisla-
tion affords an excuse for this view, trade barriers are nei-
their new nor peculiar to state governments. Such laws have
been enacted by federal, state, and municipal authorities
alike, the restrictions by the federal government being
among the oldest and those by municipal authorities the
most numerous. Moreover, the discriminatory hindrances
to trade which have been given statutory form in such laws
are often indistinguishable economically from the barriers to
trade established and maintained by private groups for their
own advantage. The distinguishing feature of governmental
trade barriers is public sanction, not economic effect. The
distinguishing feature of state trade barriers is merely the
fact that they are now in the public eye.
Trade barrier laws do not grow like weeds in a vacant
lot, without planting or tending. They are drafted, proposed,
advocated by cajolery, pressure, and inducement, and sup-
ported against counter attack. The driving force for their
enactment and administration is supplied by groups which
find them serviceable. Although it is a truism to say that
discriminatory legislation expresses the power of special in-
terests, there is a tendency to regard each law as an isolated
political fact rather than as a part of the coordinated strate-
gy of an interest group. To deal with trade barrier laws
statute by statute is somewhat like trying to cure the measles
spot by spot. Such therapy ignores the power and purpose
of those who procured the laws' enactment and who will
devise a dozen alternate plans to accomplish the same dis-
criminatory purposes.
Trade barrier laws appear in truer perspective if they
are regarded as among the devices, both public and private,
* United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
(169)
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available to groups which seek favored positions. Such
groups may pursue a strategic advantage in many ways-
by patents, trademarks, advertising, long-term contracts,
integration, mergers, reciprocal buying, commercial bribery,
and other private devices of varying repute and effect. If
they are large enough they may seek legal favors of assorted
kinds from city, state, and national governments, a greater
size being usually requisite for a successful appeal to the
larger governmental units. The available devices, both po-
litical and private, may be used in combination. Indeed, the
security of the group tends to increase as it comes to depend
less upon any single source of advantage.
The activities of private groups designed to establish and
maintain trade barriers may be roughly distinguished from
the other activities of such groups by their general purpose
and effect. Ordinary competitive behavior of the sort exhaus-
tively analyzed by generations of economists centers upon
making, pricing, and selling goods under the pressure of
similar activities of competitors which provide incentives to
be efficient and to hold profits to a minimum. But such
competitive behavior is accompanied by a struggle for posi-
tions of advantage which will shelter those who attain them
from the ordinary competitive pressures. The object of such
a struggle is to place obstacles between one's rivals and
certain opportunities to sell which they might otherwise en-
joy. It is a struggle toward relative advantage rather than
absolute gain-toward the power to restrain the trade of
others rather than toward maximum immediate trade for
oneself. Once achieved, the advantageous position affords
those who hold it a limited monopoly; but the effort to at-
tain such a position may be fiercely competitive. Though
economic theorists have begun to describe the varieties of
monopolistic competition in the market which may take
place among concerns with various degrees and kinds of
special advantage, they have said relatively little about the
competitive tactics by which such special advantages are es-
tablished, nor about the trade practices in which such advan-
tages are institutionalized. Hence, though much is known
about these tactics and practices, it remains scattered in
reports of investigations and records of legal proceedings.1
'Though the two categories "trade barrier" and "unlawful restraint'
overlap, they are not identical. Federally sanctioned trade bar-
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In the following summary of privately erected trade bar-
riers no sharp distinction will be made between those which
depend partly upon the machinery of public laws and those
whose machinery is entirely private. A principal point to
be illustrated is the fact that public and private means are
used interchangeably to accomplish the same private end.
Among the most ancient and effective forms of inter-
ference with trade is the limitation upon the right to en-
gage in a particular type of enterprise. Indeed, the common
law of restraint of trade had its origin in a series of cases
involving private contracts in which the right to engage in
specified trades was surrendered. Today public authority and
private control over indispensable facilities may both be used
to prevent certain competitors from entering a line of business.
Illustrations of the use of public authority abound in
the occupations which are regarded as affected with a public
interest to such an extent as to require a public license. Many
building codes require, for example, that plumbing be done
only by licensed plumbers, the ground for the requirement
being the danger that incompetent plumbing installations will
involve hazards to public health. The actual administration
of the machinery for examining plumbers and granting li-
censes is frequently placed in the hands of local officials who
are or have been licensed plumbers and who are keenly aware
of the private interests of the plumbing trade. From time
to time there are complaints that tricky examinations de-
signed to limit the number of successful applicants have been
used in an effort to protect established plumbers from com-
petition. In some jurisdictions an effort is made to interpret
the license requirements in such a way as to protect the
master plumbers' lucrative trade in plumbing equipment from
the competition of mail order houses. A Pennsylvania plumb-
ing code, for example, forbids persons who are not registered
riers are exempt from the antitrust laws and barriers established
entirely through state and local legislation are difficult to at-
tack under these laws. Even trade barriers which have no public
sanction may be unlawful only if they are established or maintained
by joint action or if they contribute to unlawful joint action or
if they tend to establish a monopoly position for a single enter-
prise. When several rival enterprises individually restrain trade
in such a way that each enjoys a relatively sheltered position
against newcomers, there may be private restraint of trade with-
out violation of federal laws.
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plumbers to advertise or display plumbing equipment for
sale at retail.2
Other groups engaged in building have also sought the
protection of licenses. Electricians are widely licensed on
the theory that incompetent electrical work creates a fire
hazard. In at least one major city the electrical license is
so rigidly interpreted that only a licensed electrician is al-
lowed to plug the cord from a welding machine into an elec-
trical connection, although the operation is no more diffi-
cult than the plugging of an electric percolator cord into a
wall outlet. One state has gone so far as to require that all
tile setting be done by licensed contractors. This statute
strengthened the efforts of organized tile contractors to
prevent the purchase of unset tile by the consumer and by
so-called jobbers who distribute it to small tile setters.
Similar efforts to extend the scope of a licensing re-
quirement and thereby to exclude inconvenient competition
are to be found among pharmacies and in the legal profes-
sion itself. There have been attempts to prevent the dis-
tribution of packaged drugs by concerns which did not em-
ploy a registered pharmacist and to define the practice of
law so that it includes filling in the blanks upon standard
legal forms for the making of a lease or the adjustment of an
insurance claim.
More subtle devices to exclude certain types of concern
from the market consist in the imposition of requirements
as to equipment or performance which can be easily met by
some concerns but are prohibitive to others. It is alleged
that the campaign of ice cream manufacturers against the
use of the counter freezer has included efforts to secure the
enactment of sanitary legislation for ice cream manufacture
which will require the sterilization of all equipment with live
steam and the use of a cement floor which slopes toward a
central drain.3 Neither requirement is burdensome to a
factory, but a soda fountain which could obtain a counter
freezer only by installing a sloping cement floor, a central
drain, and a steam boiler would be unlikely to make its own
ice cream. Similarly, the building ordinances of many cities
are so designed as to exclude new types of building material
2 Newcastle, Pennsylvania, Plumbing Code, Act of 1937, §2.
3 United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, et al, Indict-
ment, Nov. 1, 1938.
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and new methods of building construction. In some cases
the restrictive features of these ordinances are the accidental
result of excessively detailed specifications and infrequent
revision. Some of the newest codes, however, contain sim-
ilar restrictive features which were inserted after pressure
from local building trades groups. The Chicago building code,
for example, has been so written that it systematically favors
the use of lath and plaster rather than plasterboard, insula-
tion board, or hard fibre board; and this result was achieved
in spite of the recommendations of a technical committee and
in conformity to the recommendations of representatives of
local plaster contractors and unions. Builders who erect pre-
fabricated houses are often unable to meet the requirements
of a local building code because dealers, contractors, and
unions who do not wish to see construction operations shifted
from a jobsite to a factory are able to prevent the liberaliza-
tion of building codes and even to introduce new restrictive
features into the codes.
In a few cities the exclusion of concerns from the market
is accomplished by burdensome requirements for a report
rather than by specifications as to the product. The city of
Dayton, Ohio, for example, requires that the seller of plumb-
ing equipment affix a sticker which is to be obtained from
the municipality and that he make weekly reports which
include the place of installation of each piece of equipment.
Ostensibly this legislation is intended to handicap the sale
of used plumbing equipment which may not be in sound
condition and to make it difficult to sell plumbing equipment
stolen from unfinished houses. Sears Roebuck has contended
in a suit against the city that the actual effect of the or-
dinance is to make it difficult to sell plumbing equipment by
mail, both because of the difficulty in obtaining and affixing
stickers and because a mail order house seldom knows the
exact point of installation of the products it sells.4
Exclusion of concerns from certain markets may be ac-
4 In its first form the Dayton sticker ordinance was designed to make
unlawful both the purchase and the sale of equipment without
stickers and to make the possession of a piece of equipment
without a sticker prima facie evidence of violation. After this
ordinance was held unconstitutional the city enacted the revised
ordinance described above. On November 26th the case of Direct
Plumbing Co., et al, v. the City of Dayton, challenging the second
ordinance, was pending on appeal before the Supreme Court of
Ohio.
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complished even more indirectly by a public requirement
that sellers use a privately owned grademark which is not
readily available. Within the last year the Antitrust Divi-
sion has found such practices in the sale of Southern pine,
Western pine, and Douglas fir lumber. The lumber manu-
facturing industry had persuaded the Department of Com-
merce to include in American Lumber Standards, promul-
gated by the Department, a provision that conformity to
such standards should be indicated by the grademark of the
lumber trade association covering the particular species. It
had also persuaded Federal purchasing authorities to include
-a requirement for an association grademark in certain Fed-
eral lumber specifications. In some parts of the country the
use of grademarked lumber is a condition for the approval of
loans by the Federal Housing Administraiton. In the far
West regional lumber associations induced a considerable
number of local building authorities to require association
grademarking in the local building code. As a result of these
requirements a lucrative part of the market for lumber was
open only to those whose product bore the grademark of a
lumber trade association. The grademarking plan adopted
by some of the most important regional associations author-
ized approved employees of member mills to grade and grade-
mark the output of those mills under the supervision of in-
spectors provided by the association to check the accuracy of
the grading. No such right to grade was granted to inde-
pendent mills. The association's inspectors were likewise
empowered to grade lumber and issue an inspection certificate
upon payment of a fee, but the certificate plan was neces-
sarily more costly than mill grading. Moreover, when the
certificates were made available to nofi-members of the asso-
ciation a higher fee was charged, with the effect that the
non-member was placed at a disadvantage in competitive
bidding upon graded lumber. In one regional association,
inspectors promoted the products of members of the associa-
tion as against independents by means which included maxi-
mum publicity for substandard independent lumber and min-
imum publicity for substandard lumber from association mem-
bers. Another regional association granted to certain retail
lumber yards the right to affix grademarks, and by denying
this right to other competing yards limited the number of
retailers which could compete for business in grademarked
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lumber. To prevent the use of the association grademarks
by other grading agencies these marks were registered as
trademarks. In some cases strenuous efforts were made to
prevent the grademark of an independent lumber association
from being recognized as conforming to the requirements set
forth in American Lumber Standards. The effect of the en-
tire plan was to reserve for member mills most of the busi-
ness of the Federal government and of private builders in
certain parts of the country.,
Private concerns frequently are able to exclude others
from a line of business by virtue of their exclusive control
over an indispensable product, process, or facility. The sim-
plest case of this kind is refusal by the holder of a patent
to license its use or arbitrary restriction of the number of
licensees. Corning Glass Works and General Electric Com-
pany, for example, are the only concerns which have the
right to make the tubing for neon lights. Only the Dow
Chemical Company has obtained an American license for the
manufacture of pig magnesium. Often the power conveyed
by a patent has been supplemented and extended by a busi-
ness strategy in which various patents are conceived as
weapons to be used together. The glass container industry,
for example, has followed a consistent policy of developing
patents it does not intend to use in order to "fence in" con-
cerns which might otherwise be able to limit the effect of
a patent monopoly by patenting alternative ways to accom-
plish the same result.6 In the radio field a patent pool closed
to outsiders gave the members of the pool freedom to use
all the important technical methods while it exposed new-
comers to the necessity of devising unpatented substitute
methods at all points simultaneously.7
Exclusive ownership or lease of scarce facilities may be
as effective as a patent. The position of Western Union
United States v. Western Pine Association, et al, Indictment, Sept.
18, 1940; United States v. West Coast Lumbermen's Association,
et al, Indictment, Sept. 25, 1940; United States v. Southern Pine
Association, et al, Indictment, Feb. 19, 1940. In the latter case
pleas of nolle contendere were entered on Feb. 21, 1940 and South-
ern Pine Association was fined $10,000 and each of remaining de-
fendants fined $1,000 on same date. Consent decree was entered
Feb. 21, 1940.6 Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, Part
2 (U.S. Gov. Printing Office, 1939) 776.




Telegraph Company is partly due to a system of contracts
with railroads which gave the company exclusive use of
railroad rights of way for the erection of its poles and lines
and use of railroad terminals for Western Union offices.,
The development of new sulphur companies is prevented in
spite of the high profits which such companies enjoy because
the existing companies own or lease substantially all the
workable deposits of brimstone.0 The Government's suit
against the Aluminum Company alleges that the company
has sought to prevent the rise of competition by acquiring
all the commercially available bauxite and the most accessible
sources of cheap water power. 10 The United Fruit Company's
dominance of the trade in bananas is at least partially due
to the fact that it controls the banana railroads and the only
telegraph line between Honduras and the United States.1
Exclusion from the market need not be based upon legal
rights or private monopolies so absolute as those described
in the foregoing paragraphs. Any restriction upon the ac-
cess by rival concerns to credit, raw materials, means of
transportation, productive equipment, or labor may suffi-
ciently handicap the independent concern. In some cases the
members of an industry may refuse to make available to new
concerns certain costly services which they cooperatively main-
tain or may provide these services in a less efficient way at
higher cost. In some cases an organized group may use boycott,
threat, or bribe to force suppliers to refuse to serve concerns
outside the organization. In some cases the organized group
cannot cut off such service but obtains differential treatment
which gives it so great an advantage that the independent
cannot survive.
The Department of Justice has charged the American
Medical Association with attempting to destroy a cooperative
plan for the provision of medical service by depriving the
cooperative of access to hospitals and of the opportunity
to obtain consultation upon difficult cases, and by excluding
sUnited States v. Western Union Telegraph Company, Petition, Dec.
1, 1937.
9Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, op.
cit. supra note 6, part 5, 1987-2008.
10 United States v. Aluminum Company of America, et al, Petition, Apr.
23, 1937.
] Kepner and Scothill, The Banana Empire (1935) 26, 178, 182;
Fortune (Mar. 1933) 26ff.
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the cooperative's doctors from the association. 12 In a Chi-
cago milk case the Department charged the large milk dis-
tributors with refusal to let independents use the bottle ex-
change and with conspiring with the unions to prevent the
delivery of independent milk."s A recent indictment of pro-
ducers of military optical equipment included a charge that
the American and German companies had agreed not to supply
information or equipment to any competitor.1 4 In the Alum-
inum case witnesses testified that a power company which
has officials of the Aluminum Company upon its board of
directors lost interest in a large power contract as soon as
it became clear that the buyer of the power intended to be-
gin the manufacture of aluminum. In a case against the
Association of American Railroads the Department charges
that the railroads agreed not to establish combination through
rates for shipment by rail and motor carrier similar to the
combination rates which are established among railroads and
that they thus sought to exclude motor carriers from partici-
pation in a large part of the long-haul business."s A proceed-
ing against potash manufacturers charged that they had
agreed not to sell potash directly to cooperatives, individual
farmers, or fertilizer mixers which were not recognized by
all manufacturers.- 6 Indictments covering tile contractors,:7
plaster contractors, 8 electrical contractors,19 glass contrac-
'1 United States v. American Medical Association, et al, Indictment,
Dec. 20, 1938.
13United States v. The Borden Company, et al, Indictment, Nov. 1,
1938. Complaint filed Sept. 14, 1940, consent decree entered Sept.
16, 1940, and nolle prosequi entered in criminal case.
'14United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Company, et al, Indictment,
Mar. 26, 1940. Pleas of nolo contendere entered and four defend-
ants fined $10,000 each on May 27, 1940.
15United States v. The Association of American Railroads, et al, Com-
plaint, Oct. 25, 1939.1GUnited States v. American Potash & Chemical Corporation, et al,
Indictment, May 26, 1939. Complaint filed May 15, 1940 and con-
sent decree entered May 21, 1940.
:7 United States v. Wheeling Tile Company, et al, Indictment, Dec. 5,
1939; United States v. Mosaic Tile Company, et al, Indictment, Jan.
15, 1939; United States v. St. Louis Tile Contractors Association,
et al, Indictment, May 17, 1940. All three of these cases were dis-
posed of by pleas of nolo contendere. Consent decrees were entered
in connection with nationwide consent decrees against the Tile
Contractors Association of America, Inc., et al, on June 10, 1940.
1sUnited States v. Contracting Plasterers' Ass'n of Long Beach, Inc.,
et al, Indictment, Feb. 2, 1940.
IgUnited States v. Santa Barbara County Chapter, National Electrical
Contractors Association, et al, Indictment, Feb. 28, 1940. United
States v. Harbor District Chapter, National Electrical Contractors
Association, et al, Indictment, Feb. 16, 1940.
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tors,20 lumber dealers,21 plumbing contractors, 22 hardwood
flooring contractors, 2 excavating contractors, 24 and haulage
companies2 5 charge various conspiracies to deprive independ-
ent concerns of union labor and to induce manufacturers and
jobbers not to supply materials to such concerns. In most
cases the pressure upon manufacturers and jobbers took the
form of a threatened boycott and the inducement to union
leaders was an offer of a more favorable labor contract.
The exclusion of independent concerns by discriminatory
prices may take various forms. A striking early illustration
is found in the rebates which the Standard Oil Company ob-
tained from the railroads prior to the enactment of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission Act. Not only was Standard's
product carried more cheaply, but Standard actually received
a portion of the transportation charge paid to the railroad
by its rivals. More recently, price discrimination in favor
of large distributors was thought to involve such a threat
to the existence of their smaller rivals that the Congress
passed the Robinson-Patman Act as a remedy. This Act
greatly reduced overt discriminations in price but did not
destroy the opportunity to accomplish a discrimination in
fact while keeping prices uniform. Integrated companies
which sell a portion of their semi-manufactured products are
often in competition with their own customers. In such a
case a relatively high price upon the products they sell to
their rivals will not impair their own profits but will so
reduce the margin available for the final processes of man-
ufacture as to threaten the existence of the rival concern.
Government testimony in the aluminum case alleges that the
Aluminum Company sought to monopolize the manufacture
of duralumin and of fabricated aluminum products by charg-
ing a high price for aluminum ingot, which is monopolized,
2 0 United States v. W. P. Fuller & Company, et al, Indictment, Mar. 15,
1940.
21 United States v. Harbor District Lumber Dealers Association, et al,
Indictment, Mar. 15, 1940.22 United States v. The Central Supply Association, et al, Indictment,
Mar. 29, 1940.
23 United States v. San Francisco Hardwood Floor Contractors' Associ-
ation, et al, Indictment, Dec. 20, 1939.
24 United States v. Arthur Morgan Trucking Co., et al, Indictment, Jan.
23, 1940.
25 United States v. Nat Hoffman, et al, Indictment, Apr. 8, 1940;
United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n., et al, In-
dictment, Jan. 23, 1940.
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and a relatively low price for products made from the ingot
which were likewise sold by competitors.
Devices like those just described may be effective even
when they do not exclude from the market the concerns
against which they are directed. So long as they create
difficulties for the independent concern, they tend to raise
its cost, expose its customers to delays, impair the quality
of its service, and restrict the amount of business it can
do. Thus the proportion of the total business done by the
independent is reduced and he is made more vulnerable to
ordinary competition. A private trade barrier, like a public
law, may serve its purpose even though it is only partially
effective.
Other devices are intended to deprive rivals of access
to an adequate system of distribution for their products.
Many of these seek to bind distributors to a single producer,
either by the producer's direct ownership of distributive
channels or by contracts which exclude the products of com-
petitors. Such arrangements afford a ready market for the
products of one concern and may force competitors either
to find new distributors or to go to the expense of creating
their own distributive outlets. Major producers of moving
pictures, for example, control affiliated chains of moving
picture theatres through which they may be sure of a wide
distribution of their product. Until the recent consent de-
cree in the case of United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
et al, it was customary to offer a fifty-two weeks' supply
of films in a single contract, so that independent the-
atres wishing to deal with the major companies were re-
quired to contract for a block of pictures so large as to leave
them without demand for films from other studios. The
majors gave preference to their theatres and to certain pow-
erful independent chains by permitting them to show new
pictures first and sometimes by supplying them with better
films and charging them lower rentals. The independent
theatre was at a disadvantage in competing with the con-
trolled theatre and with the independent theatre chain. The
independent producer was likewise at a disadvantage in mar-
keting his product.
A similar illustration is found in the contracts of the
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National Broadcasting Company.26 Local independent sta-
tions which join a network are forbidden to broadcast pro-
grams of another network company and are required to re-
serve for national broadcasts whatever time is optioned by
the National Broadcasting Company. About two-thirds of
the optioned time is never used. The local stations are for-
bidden to accept advertisements from national advertisers
at rates below those charged by the network. National
Broadcasting Company may assign any local station either
to the red network, which is profitable, or to the blue net-
work, which carries a larger proportion of sustaining pro-
grams and is relatively unprofitable. The control of optioned
time makes it difficult for any company outside the network
to obtain the use of desirable local radio time, while the
control over advertising rates prevents the locals from find-
ing a by-pass to large clients. The power to transfer sta-
tions from one network to another is an effective means of
discipline in any controveries between the national and the
locals.
Less complicated arrangements for exclusive dealing are
relatively frequent. In an antitrust suit the Government
charges that the Masonite Corporation has induced its po-
tential competitors to agree that they will neither make hard
fibre board nor buy it from any other company, and that in
consequence practically all of such board is produced by the
Masonite Corporation.27 The Federal Trade Commission re-
ported recently that manufacturers of agricultural imple-
ments require their dealers to agree not to handle competing
products.2 8 Since such products are sold in sparsely settled
communities, many of which will not support more than one
dealer, each manufacturer thereby acquires a series of local
monopolies. In the distribution of gasoline many producers
charge one-half cent less per gallon to filling stations which
will agree to handle only one product, and thereby compel
other producers to build up their own system of filling sta-
tion outlets. An interesting variation of this type of control
26 Federal Communications Commission, Report of the Committee ap-
pointed by the Commission to supervise the investigation of chain
broadcasting (mimeographed, 1940) 52-72.27 United States v. Masonite Corporation, et al, Complaint, Mar. 11, 1940.
28 Federal Trade C6mmission, Report on the Agricultural Implements
and Machinery Industry. H. R. DOC. No. 702, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.,
(1) (1938) 268-288.
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over a market is alleged in an antitrust suit against a South-
ern newspaper which is charged with having excluded rival
papers from its city by binding its advertisers not to pur-
chase space in any other paper.2 9
Control of distributors is often limited to devices in-
tended to make the distributor handle a product he does not
want in order to obtain a product which he does want. Mon-
opoly, reputation, or quality may have established a domi-
nant position for a product while other goods from the same
producer are exposed to severe competition. Contracts which
prevent the various articles from being handled separately
are used to stretch the control of the major product into a
control over the minor products also. An example is afford-
ed by the United Shoe Machinery Company's lease
contracts, which formerly provided that the leased machines
could not be used in conjunction with other machines from
rival producers.30 The Pullman Company is charged in an
antitrust suit with refusal to operate sleeping cars which
it does not build.31 In other antitrust proceedings automo-
bile companies were required to discontinue their insistance
that installment purchases of their cars be financed through
their own financial subsidiaries.3 ? Automobile dealers are
still required to buy parts and accessories from the companies
which produce their cars. Similarly, lease contracts for ac-
counting machinery formerly provided for a higher rental
if the lessee did not buy his punch cards from the manu-
facturer from whom he leased the machine.3 3  In 1937 the
Federal Trade Commission ordered the California Packing
Company and the Alaska Packing Company to cease requir-
ing that commodities they purchase be routed through a
terminal which they control.34
29United States v. Chattanooga News-Free Press Co., Information,
June 13, 1940.30 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 258 U.S.451 (1922).
31 United States v. The Pullman Company, et al, Complaint, July 12,
1940.
S2 United States v. Chrysler Corporation, et al, United States v. Ford
Motor Company, et al. Indictments, May 27, 1938 (Complaints
filed Nov. 7, 1938 and consent decree entered Nov. 15, 1938);
United States v. General Motors Corp., et al, Indictment, May 27,
1938 (Corporation defendants convicted on Nov. 16, 1939 and fine
of $5,000 imposed on each of four corporations Nov. 17, 1939).
33United States v. International Business Machine Corp., Decree, Dec.
26, 1935.
34 In the Matter of California Packing Corporation, et als, F.T.C.
Order, Dock. No. 2786 (June 30, 1937).
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For the most part, the controls of distribution which
have been discussed above were intended to give certain
producers an advantage over others. Controls designed to
provide an advantage for certain types of distributors are
also prevalent. Products may be distributed directly by man-
ufacturers, by mail order houses and chain stores which buy
from manufacturers, by cooperatives, or by the traditional
channels through wholesalers and retailers. Within each
type of distributive channel there are competing sub-types.
Wholesalers, for example, may carry stocks and attempt to
cover the whole market, may take orders but depend upon
direct shipment from the manufacturer, may specialize in
serving certain types of customers, or may specialize in sales
at auction. Thus there may be a wide variety in the services
provided by a wholesale distributor.
In the struggle for survival between different types of
distributors there is a constant effort to gain a decisive ad-
vantage by boycotts or discriminatory discounts. Such ef-
forts are sometimes of interest only to the distributors, but
frequently the interests of producers are likewise involved
because the triumph of one type of distributor means also
a victory for the producers who can most effectively use
this type. One orange growers' cooperative, for example,
sells a large part of its output through fruit auctions, whereas
another is primarily interested in sales to the wholesale de-
partments of chain stores. The fortunes of the conflict be-
tween chain store buyers and independent commissionmen
necessarily affect the relative prosperity of these two groups
of growers.
Since the price and discount policies of manufacturers
often operate as barriers to effective competition by certain
types of distributors, it is particularly difficult in the field
of distribution to distinguish between the ordinary processes
of competition and the effort to build up institutions which
give some group a special advantage. This discussion will
not attempt to deal with the more intricate problems in-
volved, but will be limited to cases in which the effort to
erect trade barriers is peculiarly obvious.
In 1938 the Federal Trade Commission found that win-
dow glass manufacturers had divided their customers into
quantity buyers and others and were allowing quantity buy-
ers large discounts which gave them a monopoly of whole-
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saling service.35 Status as a quantity buyer was conditioned
upon willingness to accept an assigned sales territory. Thus
the discount system was used to police the establishment of
a closed group of wholesale distributors with allocated shares
of the total market. Similarly, the Department of Justice
has alleged that manufacturers of optical equipment have
agreed to grant wholesale discounts only to certain whole-
salers who have been arbitrarily chosen by themselves and
that this agreement serves to prevent other wholesalers
from doing business.3( From time to time retail distributors
of cement have induced cement manufacturers to grant a
dealer's discount only to certain recognized dealers and thus,
by agreement, to restrict the number of concerns which may
sell cement at retail. Manufacturers of gypsum, plasterboard,
and wallboard are bound by the terms of patent licenses to
observe uniform systems of distributive discounts available
to designated groups of distributors.3 7
Such limitations upon the availability of distributors'
discounts are often coupled with refusals to sell to certain
types of distributors. In some cases these refusals express
the interest of the selling group; in others they are due to
effective pressure by organized distributors of other types.
In the lumber industry, for example, manufacturing groups
have frequently followed an agreed policy of distribution
which reserves portions of the lumber market for lumber
manufacturers and provides that lumber shall be sold to
other portions of the market only by wholesale or retail
dealers.38 Similar division of the market has often prevailed
in the cement industry. Jobbers of flat glass have been
charged in antitrust cases with conspiracy to persuade glass
manufacturers not to sell direct to independent dealers.3 9 In
the tile industry manufacturers and certain local groups of
contractors and tile setters have repeatedly attempted to ex-
clude jobbers and independent contractors from the market
both by cutting off their supplies of tile and by preventing
35 In the Matter of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., et al, F.T.C. Dock. No.
3145 (Oct. 30, 1937) (Findings of Facts & Conclusion).
36 United States v. Optical Wholesalers National Association, Inc., et
al, Indictment, May 28, 1940.
37United States v. United States Gypsum Co., et al, Indictment, June
28, 1940.
s See note 5 supra.
3D For example see note 20 supra.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
them from hiring union labor.40 In some localities milk
distributing companies and milk drivers' unions have agreed
to prevent the sale of milk by retail stores in order to force
customers to use door-to-door systems of delivery.41 In the
plumbing industry a systematic effort has been made by
master plumbers, unions, and jobbers to prevent manufac-
turers from selling plumbing equipment direct to the user
or through mail order houses as intermediaries.2 In the
mineral wool industry a system of patent licenses covering
both product and process is used to require sub-licensees who
use the patented process to buy only the patented product
and to buy it from concerns which are licensed to produce it. 43
Although most of the restraints upon distributive chan-
nels have been based upon patents, actual or threatened boy-
cotts, or simple collusive plans for distribution, the oil in-
dustry illustrates the accomplishment of similar ends through
purchases made by the integrated concerns. The major
companies have at times established buying pools designed
to purchase the entire output of gasoline by independent
companies in order that the independent supplies might be
placed upon the market at such a rate and through such
channels as the majors saw fit.44
Many of the restraints upon access to the market are
directed not against new or small concerns or concerns of a
certain type but against any concern outside a specified
area. They amount to privately organized protective tariffs
surrounding a particular locality. In this field the resem-
blance of private purposes achieved by private means to
similar purposes achieved by public means is particularly
striking. Indeed, it is notorious that the establishment of
tariff schedules becomes a battle ground between the special
interests favorably and adversely affected; and many of
state trade barriers are frankly designed to protect business
within the state from outside competitors.
The building industry contains an unusual number of
40 See note 17 supra.
41 See note 13 supra.
42 See note 22 supra.
43 United States v. Johns-Manville, et al, Complaint, June 24, 1940.
44 See for example: United States v. General Petroleum Corporation of
California, et al, Indictment, Nov. 14, 1939. Thirty-three defend-
ants pleaded nolo contendere and were fined in July and August,
1940.
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restraints designed to protect local business. Two indict-
ments secured in the recent housing investigation by the
Antitrust Division charge that local enterprises and unions
handling millwork have conspired to prevent the installation
of millwork made outside the state.45 Two indictments charge
similar conspiracies to prevent the purchase or installation
of electrical fixtures from other states.46  One indictment in-
volves a similar charge concerning sheet metal. 47  Three in-
dictments charge the existence of similar conspiracies against
the use of metal strips, metal rods, and similar building ac-
cessories which were bent or shaped in another state rather
than on the jobsite.48  One indictment charges an effort to
force the use of local marble.49 Two others charge conspir-
acies to prevent the installation of factory-glazed windows.5 0
An indictment in Chicago charges a conspiracy by local con-
tractors and the building trades council to require the use
of limestone fabricated in Chicago rather than in Indiana,
in spite of the fact that the workers in Indiana receive a
higher wage than in Chicago.51 A peculiarly significant case
is one in Illinois in which it is charged that local dealers,
contractors, and labor conspired to prevent the erection of
a prefabricated house, first by withholding the services of
contractors and workmen and later by physical violence
against people brought in to do the work.r2  Indictment of
this conspiracy was followed by a series of difficulties in
securing approval of the house by local building inspectors.
'5 United States v. Lumber Institute of Allegheny County, et al, In-
dictment, Feb. 23, 1940; United States v. Lumber Products Associ-
ation, Inc., et al, Indictment, June 26, 1940.
46 United States v. Local No. 3 of the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, et al (No.107-176), Indictment, Mar. 28, 1940;
United States v. Beardslee Chandelier Manufacturing Co., et al,
Indictment, Feb. 14, 1940.
47United States v. Local Union No.99, Sheet Metal Workers Interna-
tional Association, et al, Indictment, Apr. 27, 1940.
As United States v. Wood, Wire, and Metal Lathers' International Union,
Local No.46, et al (No.107-385, 107-386, No.107-387), Indictments,
May 10, 1940.
ADUnited States v. Associated Marble Companies, et al, Indictment,
June 17, 1940.
GO United States v. Glass Contractors' Association, et al, Indictment,
May 10, 1940. United States v. Glaze-Rite Co., et al, Indictment,
Nov. 10, 1939.
51 United States v. Chicago & Cook County Building and Construction
Trades Council, et al, Indictment, Feb. 1, 1940.
2United States v. B. Goedde & Company, et al, Indictment, Sept. 21,
1940.
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Such efforts to segregate a local market are not con-
fined to the building industry,, though they are peculiarly
prevalent there. An indictment secured by the Antitrust
Division alleges a conspiracy to prevent the sale of wine not
locally bottled.53 Several indictments, as well as various in-
vestigations not yet completed involve efforts by local groups
of teamsters to require the use of local drivers and unloaders.
In a typical case the local union would not permit the union
driver who brought the truck to the city line to drive it
within the city unless a local driver was also hired to sit
beside him on the driver's seat. The truck's crew often is
not permitted to unload the truck but instead the owner is
forced to employ local men in unloading.
In nearly all of the cases which have been mentioned,
the trade barrier was intended to serve one concern or group
at another's expense. In some instances, however, trade
barriers are established by mutual consent, each concern be-
ing willing to surrender or limit its access to other parts of
the market in return for a more sheltered position in some
portion of the market reserved for itself. The most obvious
illustrations of this type of trade barrier are those in which
enterprises agree upon an allocation of the available busi-
ness. Often, however, such agreements are supplemented by
measures designed to prevent the rise of new enterprises not
bound by the agreement.
The simplest agreements are territorial. German and
American makers of military optical instruments entered
into a contract dividing the world market and stipulating
that if they were asked to bid upon business not assigned
to them they would submit a courtesy bid high enough to
avoid getting the business.54 A similar division of world trade
outside the United States was maintained before the present
war by an agreement between Aluminum, Ltd., of Canada
and the European members of an international aluminum
cartel; and the government has charged that the Aluminum
Company of America participated in this agreement in order
to reserve the American market for itself.56
53 United States v. Wine, Liquor and Distillery Workers Union, Local
No. 20244, et al, Indictment, May 31, 1939.
5 See note 14 supra.
55 See note 10 supra.
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In other cases the agreements assign the amount of
business to be done rather than the geographical area to
be covered. Until recently, makers of fibre shipping con-
tainers were allotted percentages of the total volume of busi-
ness and each concern received frequent statistical reports
to enable it to adjust its sales policy in order to maintain its
proportion of the total business 6 A similar plan has been
used to restrict and allocate the production of Kraft paper. 7
Manufacturers of Western pine, Douglas fir, and Southern
pine, according to charges in indictments, agreed among
themselves to restrict the total quantity of their species of
lumber and to apportion shares in the allowable output.,,
Manufacturers of print cloth recently undertook a similar
scheme so publicly that a statement of their plan was re-
leased to the newspapers.5 9 Electric light manufacturers
who operate under patents not only are required by license to
divide the American market from the world market but are
also subject to a prohibitive increase of royalty if their sales
exceed a stipulated proportion of the total American sales. 0
In a considerable number of marketing agreements ap-
proved under the Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act,
growers and shippers of various fruits and vegetables have
undertaken to limit the total shipments and to divide the
allowable business according to some agreed formula. It is
interesting to note that although the marketing agreement
program was intended to permit collective action by farmers
who are too numerous and small to bargain effectively as
individuals such farmers have typically failed to work out an
agreed marketing program; and the act has been used pri-
marily for products which are already partially protected
from competition. In some cases this protection is derived
from climatic conditions which localize the crop and from
private action such as the concentration of acreage in cor-
porate farms controlled by food processors and distributors.
In other cases the protection springs from other legislation,
GO United States v. National Container Association, et al, Indictment,
Aug. 9, 1939. Consent decree entered Apr. 23, 1940.
G7 United States v. Kraft Paper Association, et al, Indictment, July 20,
1939. Consent decree entered Sept. 10, 1940.
58 See note 5 sup-ra.
50 United States v. Joseph Sirrine, et al, Information, Jan. 2, 1940.
Go United States Tariff Commission, Incandescent Electric Lamps, Re-
port No. 133 (2nd series, 1939) 37.
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such as laws establishing a limited milkshed to serve a
metropolitan area.
Some plans for the allocation of business attempt to
prevent transfer of customers or to restrict each enterprise
to a different type of product which is bought by a different
group of customers. Refinishers of textiles at one time as-
signed each customer to a particular refinishing concern and
forbade others to accept their work. In a small Middle West-
ern city local distributors of milk and the organized milk
wagon drivers recently decided that to quarantine the com-
petition of a distributor who had reduced prices they would
prevent customers from changing distributors unless in their
opinion there was a reasonable excuse for the change. Build-
ing material manufacturers who secure their supplies of hard
fibre board from the Masonite Corporation are bound by con-
tract not to sell such board for any other use than building,
and thereby Masonite is given substantially exclusive control
of various industrial markets for the product.81 In several
cities Federal indictments charge that contractors for glass,62
electrical work,63 and marble64 rotate jobs among themselves,
agreeing in advance that each shall be in succession the low
bidder. But perhaps no plan to establish exclusive rights
to groups of customers is more elaborate or complete than
that involved in the Federal indictment of glass container
manufacturers. 5 The Government charges that each licensee
under patent processes for the manufacture of glass contain-
ers is restricted to making a particular type of container
purchased by particular kinds of customers and that in con-
sequence a series of product monopolies have been established
based upon the refusal to grant additional licenses. One re-
sult of this plan is said to have been that fruit jars intended
to be used by housewives for canning were sold for twice
61 See note 27 supra.
62 See note 50 supra.
6S United States v. San Francisco Electrical Contractors Association,
Inc., et al, Indictment, Mar. 2, 1940; United States v. Brooker
Engineering Company, et al, Indictment, Mar. 21, 1940; United
States v. Harbor District Chapter, National Electrical Contractors
Association, et al, Indictment, Feb. 16, 1940.
64United States v. Southern California Marble Association, et al, In-
dictment, Feb. 16, 1940. Consent Decree entered Nov. 12, 1940.
65United States v. Hartford Empire Company, et al, Complaint Dee.
11, 1939.
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as much as identical jars designed to be used by the canning
industry.
The various barriers to trade which have been described
on previous pages are often only parts of broader conspira-
cies to restrain trade. Most efforts to fix prices can be
effective only in a limited industrial area or among a limited
number of concerns, and therefore a plan to exclude out-
siders from the market becomes an indispensable means to
the success of the undertaking. But in addition to the trade
barriers which are established for their own sake and the
trade barriers which define the boundaries of a price fixing
conspiracy, there is often an effort to develop trade barriers
for disciplinary purposes. Such barriers are used to punish
enterprises which will not participate in some general plan
desired by the rest of the industry. Often, for example,
local groups of contractors in the building trades wish to
maintain a bid depository with which they file copies of
their bids which become available for inspection by the group.
Indictments by the Antitrust Division in the heating,6 elec-
trical, 7 and tile,68 contracting trades of various cities have
charged that union labor was withdrawn from concerns which
failed to file their bids with such a depository. Similarly,
some large enterprises take systematic advantage of their
size by threatening to make localized price reductions among
the customers of small concerns unless these small concerns
follow policies which are considered satisfactory. The hear-
ings on beryllium before the Temporary National Economic
Committee illustrate the fact that such threats may be in-
herent in a market situation and may be effective even
though nothing is actually said.69 The ease with which a
small enterprise may be driven from the market by a large
concern's local price cutting may thus establish a barrier to
its effective competition for more business and may accom-
6United States v. Heating, Piping & Air Conditioning Contractors'
Association of Southern California, et al, Indictment, Jan. 26, 1940.
67United States v. San Francisco Electrical Contractors' Association,
Inc., et al, Indictment, Mar. 2, 1940; United States v. Harbor Dis-
trict Chapter, National Electrical Contractors Association, et al,
Indictment, Feb. 16, 1940.
Gs United States v. St. Louis Tile Contractors' Association, et al, Indict-
ment, May 17, 1940. Complaint and consent decree entered July
1, 1940.
OD Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, op.
cit. supra note 6, part 5, at 2084-2091.
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plish as much as the more tangible barriers already described.
The recent efforts to repeal state trade barriers are
significant because they express a public awareness of the
need for free trade within the boundaries of the United
States and because they seek to deprive those who would
restrain trade of certain public endorsements which they
have secured through legislation. It is to be hoped that
the activities centering upon state governments will be sup-
plemented by similar activities directed at legal trade bar-
riers maintained by other governmental bodies. But the
repeal of all restrictive legislation which fails to express the
public interest would not in itself solve the trade bar-
rier problem. During nearly fifty years in which the
antitrust laws were revered as traditions but were not
effectively administered, much of American industry has
developed private trade barriers which are effective without
the affirmative support of any law. If law-making bodies
cannot be used to secure special advantage, the pursuit of
advantage by private means will be intensified. In spite of
the greatly increased activity of the Antitrust Division dur-
ing the last three years, the administration of the Sherman
Act is still highly selective for lack of men and money. It
may be that a systematic enforcement of the antitrust laws
will reveal the need to terminate some private trade barriers
which are not unlawful and thus will suggest the desirability
of further legislation; but the logical first step is full enforce-
ment of the existing law.
